means I will not discuss either the social bene…ts of healthful behavior, nor be judgmental about others' tastes. Although it is presumably better for society at large if people are healthier, I leave that public-policy goal as outside the scope of this paper.
1 My focus is on whether there is self-harm from activities. I also am uninterested in deciding whether some behaviors are good or bad based on my tastes or aesthetics. Mark Twain's quote above that "Nothing so needs reforming as other people's habits" strikes a cord as a permanently relevant ironic comment on policy debates in the domains we are considering. From the point of view of this essay, it is important that we …nd out if people are fatter than they want to be, exercise less than they want, smoke or drink more than they want, etc.-not what "we"
want. Indeed, the two errors I review are "Twain-proof": "we" are the same as "they" for these errors. It is not my assumption that only readers who avoid the habits discussed will deem them worthy of regulating, but those of us who succumb to them as well. 
Preferences and Habits
How might we think about habitual behavior? As an economist who believes in the profound insight of utility theory for disciplined theoretical, empirical, and policy work on this topic, I will articulate a natural way for economists (behavioral or not) to think about habitual behavior. As argued below, positing the usefulness of modeling behavior in terms of people 1 Economists are famously willing to make the point that bad health need not be costly to society. Indeed, it is my understanding that the current best estimate is that society bene…ts …nancially from tobaccoinduced lung cancer. Speaking like an economist: if it kills people relatively cheaply and with relatively good timing-late in people's working lives but early in their social-security and medicare collecting lives (in the U.S. case)-it can be bene…cial. Even if one buys into this calculus, I am not sure of the state-of-the-art estimates for obesity, but suspect they are likely to be di¤erent. 2 This is in contrast to other types of errors policymakers and economists might study (such as over-trading in stocks) where we might be con…dent that "we" don't make the same errors as the population at large. approach is that the notion that the marginal utility is higher when a person has consumed more in the past is perfectly consistent with the possibility that past consumption lowers utility levels. The essence of harmful habits is that current consumption decreases your future well being while causing you to desire those products more in the future. Rabin (1999b, 2000b) lay out a simpli…ed, binary-choice form of the Becker, Grossman, and Murphy (1991) model of tobacco addiction, which applies equally to other types of habit-forming activities. Without presenting the mathematical model here, I can outline the basic features. We assume that each day a person can either take a "hit" or not take a hit. Our model incorporates two crucial components of harmful addictive activities. First, they involve internalities. The more common case is of negative internalities, where current consumption negatively a¤ects future well being. 4 Negative internalities from consuming an addictive product may include future health, career, and personal problems, as well as "tolerance"-the fact that current consumption of a product lowers the the pleasure from future consumption. Habit-forming activities can also generate positive internalities if current consumption increases the instantaneous utility from future consumption. Second, harmful addictive activities involve habit formation: current consumption increases the marginal utility from future consumption. In other words, past consumption is assumed to increase the marginal instantaneous utility from current consumption-e.g., smoking cigarettes at age 16 increases the marginal utility from smoking a cigarette at age 17. The combination of negative internalities and habit formation means that as a person consumes more and more of an addictive product, she gets less and less pleasure from this consumption, yet she may continue to consume the product because refraining becomes more and more painful.
Internalities come in many forms. Negative internalities include health problems due to over-eating or over-smoking. A person consuming cocaine or other drugs often exhibits "tolerance" in the sense that she derives less pleasure from a given level of consumption the more she has consumed in the past. Positive internalities arise from learning and other "investment goods", which we consume both for immediate grati…cation and for long-term bene…ts. Many cultural activities are presumed to have this property.
Activities can generate internalities without being habit-forming: eating cheesecake may generate negative internalities, and going to a museum may generate positive internalities, but neither is necessarily habit-forming. This is the big empirical puzzle that I think is so important for eating and exercise: although we are con…dent that tobacco, alcohol, and other substances are very signi…cantly habit-forming, just how habit-forming eating and exercise patterns are is less clear.
What do these preferences imply about behavior? The primary assumption that economists have historically made in the context of habit formation is their standard and universally applied assumption: that people are fully rational. Before turning to potential errors people make in the next section, I …rst review what rationality implies about how people behave in the face of habit formation. A key prediction is that people are very much attuned to the future implications of their current behavior. This implies that people do not engage in activities that predictably lead to damaging bad habits whose pursuit exceeds the current pleasure of the activity.
Rather than directly address the question of whether people will rationally acquire bad habits, the original theory in Becker and Murphy (1988) paper famously focuses on a "steady state"analysis-looking for positive consumption levels such that a person would choose to remain addicted. In their empirical work, Murphy (1991, 1994) assume exogenous shocks in order to get people to become addicted. Although called a rational-choice model of addiction, this rather non-standard focus in describing a behavior whose central premise is intertemporal tradeo¤s and whose initial condition is always the same-non-addiction-might reasonably be considered a profoundly weak test of the rationality assumption. For those who think the big mistake in tobacco or alcohol addiction is to start the addiction (withdrawing from tobacco is deeply unpleasant; withdrawing from alcohol can kill you), the focus solely on "steady-state"levels is as if one explored a rationalchoice model of suicide by asking solely whether it is rational for people to stay dead once they kill themselves. Other recent researchers-see Orphanides and Zervos (1995) and Wang (2007)-followed up Becker, Grossman, and Murphy's original research by addressing the more classical dynamic decision of whether to become addicted.
The early tests of whether addiction might be rational studied a particular prediction that is consistent with fully rational behavior, but not consistent with fully myopic behavior:
that people respond to predictable changes in future prices, such as announced future tax increases. Murphy (1991, 1994) con…rm Becker and Murphy's (1988) prediction of such future price e¤ects. Although considered somewhat surprising that such future price elasticities were identi…able in the data-and despite skepticism that people would really know enough about future prices to react to them even if they wanted -Gruber and K½ oszegi (2001) and Levy (2009) in fact support the …nding of such future-price e¤ects.
But as Gruber and K½ oszegi (2001) also point out, the existence of future price e¤ects suggests a rejection of complete myopia in the face of habit formation-demonstrating that people don't engage in habit-forming behavior as if their current smoking, injecting, or eating behavior had no e¤ects whatsoever on their future attitudes towards smoking, injecting, or eating. But the fact that people are aware of such e¤ects is predicted not only by complete rationality-it is a prediction of virtually all psychologically plausible theories of people's errors. Virtually any theory proposed by behavioral economists to modify the 100% rationality model have also predicted such e¤ects. And as theoretical and empirical research suggestsoutlined in Gruber and K½ oszegi (2004) -the amount of irrationality consistent with the observable future price e¤ects would lead to wildly di¤erent policy and welfare conclusions.
This is an absolutely central point: non-withstanding paper titles, and notwithstanding the default assumption of economics, there are no claims I am aware of in any papers that argue that existing evidence supports the policy conclusions of a 100% rational-choice model except if one a priori prefers 100% as a maintained empirical hypothesis, or one prefers it as the appropriate basis for policy when evidence is not su¢ cient. Murphy's (1991, 1994) estimates (as they themselves note in a footnote) yield future-price elasticities that are small enough to be suggestive that the fully rational model is not driving behavior. Gruber and K½ oszegi (2004) show that the range of assumptions about self-control problems consistent with theirs and Becker, Grossman, and Murphy's evidence on tobacco includes optimal taxes that are much, much higher than what one would conclude under full rationality, and signi…cantly higher than existing taxes. Levy (2009) estimates signi…cant irrationality of both forms discussed below in tobacco consumptions, suggesting very di¤erent responses than if one were to assume full rationality.
In light of these …ndings, I now turn to a review of the two types of errors that theoretically may matter a lot in the context of good and bad habits. I …rst discuss the errors broadly, and then explore their implications more directly for habit formation.
Two Potential Errors
The classical economics model assumes that intertemporal preferences are time-consistent:
A person's relative preference for well-being at an earlier date over a later date is the same no matter when she is asked. But casual observation, introspection, and psychological research all overwhelmingly suggest that preferences are often time-inconsistent: we tend to pursue immediate grati…cation in a way that our "long-run selves" do not appreciate. behavior. Sophisticated people are fully aware of their future self-control problems, and therefore know exactly how their future selves will behave. Naive people are fully unaware of their future self-control problems and therefore believe their future selves will behave exactly as they currently would like them to behave.
Analysis of self-control problems typically involves comparisons of each of these types of people with the same long-run preferences: time-consistent agents are fully rational, as economists habitually assume. By systematically comparing these types of people, we are able to add insight into the role of self-control problems in habit formation, and to delineate how predictions depend on both self-control problems per se and on assumptions about foresight.
Although less integrated into formal economic models than self-control problems, recent research in economics has begun to focus on a second type of error that has been proposed (under di¤erent guises) by psychologists-and is of manifest relevance to habit formation. To see how researchers have studied misprediction across domains, think of two general categories of ways that tastes change over time: temporary ‡uctuations, such as cravings and random moods, and longer-term systematic changes, such as addiction, health changes, and lifestyles and habits. The contention of researchers is that people underappreciate changes in their preferences, and hence falsely project their current preferences over consumption onto their future preferences.
Several studies, for instance, lend support to the folk wisdom that shopping on an empty stomach leads people to buy too much. 6 This phenomenon can be interpreted as a manifestation of projection bias: people who are hungry act as if their future taste for food will re ‡ect such hunger. Read and van Leeuwen (1998) provide beautiful evidence of both "present bias"
and "projection bias"in the context of hunger. O¢ ce workers were asked to choose between healthy snacks and unhealthy snacks that they would receive in one week, either at a time when they should expect to be hungry (late in the afternoon) or satiated (immediately after lunch). 7 Half of each of these two groups was approached either immediately after lunch, while the other half of each group was approached late in the afternoon.
Percentage of Subjects Choosing Unhealthy Snack:
Future Hunger
Hungry Satiated Current Hungry 78% 56%
Hunger Satiated 42% 26%
The above chart indicates choices that subjects made a week in advance, and clearly indicates that people were in ‡uenced by their current hunger as much or more than their completely predictable future hunger state. Notice that the …ndings of in ‡uence of current hunger state has nothing to do per se with self-control problems-whether they "should" or should not want healthy foods (which are the labels the authors used, but of course did not present to subjects-who were just asked to choose among a list of items). The point is that for the choice about the exact same future situation, subjects were in ‡uenced by their current hunger. This is a surprising result given how familiar these o¢ ce workers presumably are-like the 7 billion other people-with time-of-day ‡uctuations in hunger.
The researchers however did collect evidence suggesting self-control problems and time inconsistency with respect to eating: unbeknownst to the o¢ ce workers, when the snacks were brought back next week, they were allowed to change their minds. Of those who chose healthy snacks ahead of time, 44% chose to switch to unhealthy items. Of those who chose unhealthy ones, only 3% wanted to switch to healthy! This, in a nutshell, indicates the time inconsistency. Prospectively people wanted to eat healthier than they wanted to eat later-at the moment of truth.
A fascinating study by Giordano, Bickel, Lowenstein, Jacobs, Marsch, and Badger (2002) (also analyzed in Badger, Bickel, Giordano, Jacobs, Loewenstein, and Marsch (2007) ) similarly …nds an indication of both present bias and projection bias. They studied 13 long-time adult heroin addicts who had been regularly receiving BUP-a medication that reduces craving for heroin and is used in aiding with heroin withdrawal. Addicts currently deprived of BUP like it more than those not currently deprived. Over an 8-week period, each subject was asked whether s/he would prefer each of 12 di¤erent amounts of money (ranging from $0 to $100) to a second dose after receiving an initial dose. (This second dose is still attractive to addicts.) Subjects were told (truthfully) that one of their choices, randomly selected, would be implemented. Hence, they had the incentive to choose according to their true preferences.
Half the time subjects were asked when "deprived"-2 hours before receiving their sched-uled dose for the day. In the "satiated"condition, they were asked right after receiving their dose. Half the time subjects were asked for their willingness to pay for the additional dose today (but, again, in both cases after the initial dose, whether they had gotten that initial dose yet), and other half asked for getting it 5 days hence. In all conditions, the "state" of craving for the dose they'd receive were identical, but the timing and the craving at the time of decision di¤ered. They found an average willingness to pay, as a function of both their state when asked and the imminence of delivery of the dose as follows:
When they would get the dose These results too indicate a deep neglect by even very experienced addicts of even very predictable changes in future craving levels.
Along with this projection bias, these results also indicate present bias: the fact that, irrespective of the craving state at the time asked, these addicts were willing to pay $15 more for a second dose on the same day than for a week later clearly indicates a taste for immediate grati…cation.
Unfortunately, it is harder to …nd convincing evidence of longer-term habit formation, and especially to …nd convincing evidence of misprediction of such longer-term changes. I discuss the limited evidence in the context of habit formation below.
Finally, before moving on to studying the implications of these errors, I emphasize something related to the dictum "De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum": both of these errors discussed above are errors in implementing the preferences people have, not "wrong preferences". These models take as given preferences that people have, and predict behavior and errors given those.
Even fully rational people can form "bad habits", and unless we want to moralistically embrace Mark Twain's observation, but miss the irony, our interest as a society ought be focused in a large part on understanding mistaken bad habits. Yet there are several reasons to believe that many bad habits-and missing good habits-are due to the two errors discussed above, as well as other errors. First, at a casual empirical level, people have many bad habits that they vociferously say they don't want to have. This does not prove anything-people don't always say in words what they truly want, and they may not actually know. 8 But it would be policy folly and scienti…c silliness to ignore predictable expressions of people wishing things were di¤erent for them. The fact that parents and other loved ones wish people had better habits also means something. 9 And more direct measures of well-being, from quantitative evidence like Gruber and Mullainathan's (2005) arguments that people who are heavily taxed on tobacco are on average happier, to your own observations about the seeming happiness of people you know, indicate people may not have the levels of habits that make them happiest. Finally, the fact that even the most dedicatedly rational-choice research by economists studying habits falls so incredibly short of being convincing that pure rationality rules the day, should be a strong signal.
What might the two types of errors discussed above say about habit formation? First, the direct implication of having a self-control problem is a tendency to over-consume goods and activities with negative internalities, because of underweighting the future health costs 8 And the fact that people say honestly that they wish they were thinner, or were in better physical shape, isn't per se the question we are interested in. Presumably everybody wishes they were healthier. We need to know whether people wish they paid the cost to achieve these goals, not just that they wish the goals were achieved without cost. 9 But it is likewise not proof; there are certainly wishes parents have for children that are themselves mistakes, or self-serving.
relative to the current pleasures. People may eat too much, walk too little, etc. This simple and direct fact matters a lot, and is presumably what many people have in mind when they consider over-consumption to be a problem of societal and policy concern. This overconsumption inspires some of the policies I discuss below.
But it is not about habitual nature of eating and exercise per se. This tendency to over consume would be true even if these activities were not habit-forming. Importantly, the case that habit formation itself exacerbates the e¤ects of self-control problems on overconsumption is not at all straight forward. If people are fully aware that some activity is habit-forming, then short of complete (and unrealistic) unconcern about their future, it will change their behavior. Even a person tempted by cake or by driving rather than walking who knows that current behavior will in ‡uence her future behavior and outcomes will take those e¤ects into account. The observation that the misbehavior of over-eating while young, say, is more costly if it leads to a taste for excessive eating while old, is correct as far as it goes. But that does not imply that the case for societal attention to correcting these self-control problems is any greater by dint of its habit formation. If young people (or their guardians) realize the stakes are larger, they themselves will reduce the levels of an activity.
Consider a teenager who rightly or wrongly believes that a drug is harmful to her health and future, but not addictive. She then perceives the cost of using the drug as the direct costs, which she may count less than she should because of self-control problems. But if she believes that a drug is addictive, she'll now also recognize the cost of using the drug-that it will lead her to crave the drug in the future. This may in fact deter her without outside intervention. She will be less likely to engage in addictive activities than equally pleasurable non-addictive activities.
There is a similar-more subtle, but in fact more dramatic-reversal of common intuition regarding the e¤ects of naivety about self-control. With any activity that is not habit forming, but involves trading o¤ current pleasures against future health and other costs, then-in the absence of commitment devices-naivety has roughly no e¤ect. Essentially, if eating desert today has roughly no e¤ect on either your taste for desert in the future or on how bad future desert will be for your health, then whether you are aware of your propensity to eat desert tomorrow will not in ‡uence your tendency to eat desert tonight. But if behavior is habit forming, your theory of how you will respond in the future to habits you acquire today, will in ‡uence your perceived cost of indulging today.
What e¤ect will it have? Here, the common intuition that naivety about self-control is especially damning is not necessarily right. In fact, in the most basic settings, it is backwards.
One might think that if you naively think you will avoid developing a bad habit in the future than you will be insu¢ ciently scared about acquiring the habit. But it is more painful to break yourself of a habit than to never acquire one; this is more or less what we mean by bad habits. If you naively believe that you will have the willpower to quit even if you develop a habit, then you perceive the cost of acquiring the habit as more costly than if you think you will continue to indulge anyhow. Likewise for good habits: letting yourself get out of shape is more tempting if you sophisticatedly realize you will just get out of shape in the future anyhow than if you naively think you'll make the di¢ cult reinvestment in getting back in shape.
In many simple situations, then, naivety about future self-control may help you rather than hurt you in avoiding bad habits. In other situations, sophistication may help you.
If you have more complicated tastes-especially if you realize that your tastes will change with age and you will stop being tempted-then sophistication may help you avoid naively indulging in youth when it is attractive but then building an irreversible bad habit. And, related to this point, it turns out that sophistication may help tremendously in reforming a habit that you (for some reason) acquire. Intuitively, naivety can lead you to persistently, over-optimistically predict that you will "quit tomorrow"-making you less motivated to quit today. The decision when to start withdrawing from a habit that you plan to withdraw from is psychologically and mathematically very similar to the type of "procrastination"discussed in Akerlof (1991) and analyzed in detail in O' Donoghue and Rabin (1999) . In situations where you must do something once involving an up-front cost with long-term bene…ts-precisely the case of changing a bad habit-naivety about your self-control problem almost always hurts you by making you repeatedly procrastinate under the false hypothesis that you will successfully complete the task tomorrow.
In sum, neither self-control problems per se nor naivety about future self-control problems necessarily lead to special mistakes in light of habit formation. People over-indulge in unhealthful behaviors because of self-control problems. But it is primarily the unhealthfulness per se-not the habit component-that causes the problem. Self-control problems predict that people overconsume unhealthy goods and activities, but by themselves there is no simple prediction that overconsumption is worse for habit-forming goods than for non-habit-forming goods.
The implications of projection bias, however, is less ambiguous: it does not lead to overindulgence in non-habit-forming vices, but does lead people to engage in too many bad habits. Although less sharply focused on by both researchers and policymakers, I believe it is likely to be the larger error-although certainly there are cases where both in combination may do much more damage than either mistake alone would. Simply put: some evidence, and lots of intuition, suggest that people underpredict-or, if they intellectually predict, are too inattentive to it-the e¤ects of habits. If you don't imagine at the time of choice how much your tastes will change if you change your lifestyle-if you don't believe that you'll ever come to enjoy veggies, or be satis…ed with less to eat, or that exercise at the gym or walking up that ‡ight of stairs will become easier over time-then you will under-invest in good habits and acquire many unplanned bad habits.
An interesting ancillary problem caused by projection bias for bad habits seems of clearest relevance to dieting: insofar as people underappreciate variation in hunger levels-as hinted by the Read and van Leeuwen study cited above-then you can not only overeat but "over diet"in an ine¤ective cycle of dieting and binge eating. When you just (over)ate for the day, and are very full, you may naively imagine that it is easy to refrain from eating. If you can't eat another bite right now, you may feel as if you can never eat another bite! You start the diet. And then you get hungry. Not only does the hunger lead you to eat (as it should), but you feel at such moments that it is unimaginable to go long without eating much-you may
give up altogether on the diet. And so you eat until you can't eat another bite ...
Policy Implications of Those Errors
I reiterate two points from earlier. First, unless we believe that it is likely that people are making mistakes, the fact that some activities are habit forming does not (in any way that I can understand) heighten the case for policy intervention, regulation, or paternalism.
Second, if we decide we'd like to deter some activity, we should never forget the power of prices. The most practical policy we may employ if we reach the conclusion that people are doing too much of bad habits or too little of good habits: tax or otherwise deter the bad habits, and subsidize or otherwise support the good habits. If we want to get people to do less unhealthy eating, we should make it more costly; if we want people to do more exercise, we ought to make it cheaper. Of all those quoted above, Errol Flynn is classically considered the least wise, and his observation that "My problem lies in reconciling my gross habits with my net income" does not satisfy our sense of depth in understanding habits.
But he wisely noted that not having enough money to indulge his habits was a problem and surely recognized it is more of a problem for expensive habits than cheap ones. Flynn may have recognized something deep that the others did not: making something more costly is a pretty robust way to get people to do less of it.
Quite how to go about making bad habits more costly is of course harder, and certainly old-fashioned taxation and subsidies aren't the only instruments we ought to think about.
But I worry that many concerned people might outsmart themselves while looking for more sophisticated determinants of behavior and ignore the tried and true method of literally or metaphorically using prices to in ‡uence behavior. Taxes and subsidies work to in ‡uence behavior in virtually any domain and irrespective of whether and how people are irrational.
What does the nature of habit formation, and the potential errors exacerbated by habit formation, suggest about when and how to impose the prices? There is a simple logic of how to intervene that many of us have advocated that would work in principle for bad habits, but is much harder to see how to implement with either eating or exercise (or alcohol) than with more sharply addictive activities like smoking. We are likely to get more bang for the buck by targeting people when they are younger than when they are older. If we want to stop bad habits with as little e¤ort and as little invasiveness as possible, we should stop them before they start. Indeed-and very importantly-for the various paternalistic and non-paternalistic goals, it is eminently plausible that-although we should want to stop bad habits and addictions before they start-we should not necessarily try to shut them down after they start. For good habits, the principle is that we should probably, when feasible, try to incentivize their creation but not necessarily subsidize their continuation.
The structure of habits and how to a¤ect them with taxation and other regulations is an especially important issue for another important goal of public policy: progressive taxation and redistribution. If our ancillary goal is to change behavior without too much undesirable redistributional e¤ects, some argue (often sincerely, sometimes not so sincerely) that they do not want to tax vices because (as is empirically so) many of these vices are more prevalent among lower-income people. If we tax fatty food or tobacco, we are, in many more developed countries, disproportionately taxing the poor. As Gruber and K½ oszegi (2004) argue in the context of tobacco, however, there is an incompleteness to the intuition people have that the monetary tax incidence may be regressive, because poorer people are more likely to smoke or eat fatty food than wealthy people. The …nancial cost, in fact, may get things backwards.
Simply put: a smoker pays a huge amount in taxes over the course of his lifetime. Raising taxes may get young people never to take up tobacco, and save them decades of extra taxes.
The net tax burden from raising taxes on bad habits may be negative, and therefore be a means of redistributing money towards the groups engaging most in those bad habits.
Of course, there is a clear cost to taxing people, especially if many people are consuming goods at the right level. If we impose a heavy tax on crisps, then the many people who enjoy crisps will have to pay more. Economists have good reasons to argue that when people are 100% rational, we should (depending on certain details of the structure of demand functions) tax di¤erent commodities at the same rate. If we would like to raise revenues corresponding to an average VAT of 10%, we often want to do so by having a uniform VAT. If people were 100% rational, we would not, for instance, want to have a tax of 9% on most items and 200% on unhealthy food if that raised the same amount of taxes.
Here there is an issue with the way economists are and are not contributing to a mature and empirically grounded debate about the bene…ts and costs of "sin taxes". There are two interelated doubts I have about economists' contribution to this debate, or at least something to watch out for as the debate over such taxes sharpen. First, related to both Gruber and K½ oszegi (2006) and O'Donoghue and Rabin (2006), adding even a bit of realistic self-control problems that are manifestly at least as consistent with observed demand as the 100% rational model dramatically changes what economic theory says is the optimal tax.
That is, economists have only to be a little bit wrong in our extreme rationality assumptions in order for our prescriptions for taxes to be pretty signi…cantly wrong, and for the possibility that signi…cant taxes on some unhealthy items are warranted. But this is closely related to a second problem with frequent framing by economists: even assuming that people are 100% rational, all researchers ought be forced to quantify the harm done by "distortionary"taxes.
That is, suppose that 100% of those who ate junk food were 100% rational in doing so.
If we doubled the price of such food via taxes and lowered taxes on other items to keep revenue the same, how bad would that be, using the same types of measures (like "consumer surplus") that economists already use? My sense is that the answer is often "not bad at signi…cant-seeming taxes for relatively small degrees of irrationality, and the fact that even maintaining 100% rationality does not imply a huge cost-are related: theory tells us that the welfare costs of "sin taxes" are small ("second order") to fully rational people and the welfare bene…ts are large ("…rst order") to those making the types of mistakes posited.
This, in turn, helps indicate a speci…c policy that will make sense in light of the errors discussed above, and to highlight a major theme in "behavioral public policy" research.
Under various names-cautious paternalism, conservative paternalism, benign paternalism, or libertarian paternalism, and "nudging"-research has proposed ideas of how to implement policies that do the least amount of harm to those who might be behaving fully rational and those behaving badly. To illustrate, let us abstract away from the very real implementation problems (black markets, arbitrage, the costs of ID checks, etc.), and consider the following thought experiment that could be turned into a real policy experiment-or a real policy.
Without taxing crisps or soda or cigarettes any more in total than we already do, consider merely changing the life cycle of the tax. Instead of (say) 10% tax on unhealthy items for a person's entire life, consider heavy taxes for young people for these items, and no taxes when older, in a way calculated to leave the total tax burden the same overall if people do not change their behavior. What would happen, according to di¤erent theories of motivation? If young people are acting according to fully rational models, fully realizing the habits they are forming and the costs they are incurring, then they will be made no worse o¤. Indeed, there is a behavioral prediction of the rational model: they will either keep consuming a lot in their youth and in their adulthood just like they did before, or they will stop in their youth and then start in their adulthood. But either way, economic theory based on full rationality says they will be just as well o¤ as before. How might people who have self-control problems or projection bias behave? The prediction is that they are very likely to decrease consumption dramatically both in their youth and thereafter. This is because the prediction of these alternative models is that those who were forming these habits when young (at least the ones who were close to indi¤erent before) were not planning to do so. If people don't realize they will develop a lifelong habit as strong as they will, then they never thought they were going to pay taxes later in life just because of early consumption. We've now changed taxes so that they will pay the same actual total price of the habitual behavior that they were in fact going to pay under the old taxes, but perhaps not the taxes they intended. If their old behavior was based on not realizing they were starting a habit, this would tax them out of consumption. If their old behavior was based on correct realization of their habit they were forming, it won't stop them consuming-and won't hurt them. More feasible and …netuned cousins of this hypothetical policy would improve the well-being of those overconsuming bad habits because of misprediction and would not hurt signi…cantly (or at all) those doing so There is one obvious approach we do not want to take to establish the role of habit in eating and exercise: compare the later behavior of those who eat healthy early in life to those who do not eat healthy early in life. These will almost surely be positively correlated, and one often hears statistics of this sort presented as if it is laden with meaning. It is true that kids who eat more crisps tend to turn into the adults that eat more crisps. But we can be positive that much of this is not causal: children who like crisps better turn into adults who like crisps better, and so their intrinsic taste alone guarantees their consumption. What we want to know, to understand the bene…ts of policy trying to in ‡uence early life healthfulness, is whether an "exogenous"shift in eating crisps of the sort induced by a change in policy will change late life crisp eating. To many of us inclined to believe in both the likelihood that healthful behavior is habitual, and that much of it is mistaken and hence likely to bene…t from policy oriented towards correcting it, unconvincing claims that correlation between behaviors early in life and late in life implies a causal role of habits undermines the scienti…c case for whether and how to pursue corrective policies. Nor is the heuristic that "surely" some of the correlation is causal very convincing. In fact, we care a lot how much of it is. It is even possible that there is a positive correlation but a negative causal role. Children with a sweet tooth may grow into adults with a sweet tough, even if eating sweets when young makes them less keen on sweets when old. This is a tremendously hard empirical problem to tell whether early-life behavior really turn into causal habits. In the domain of eating, it is especially di¢ cult. One would want to know whether (say) two schools or similar school districts that had di¤erent school food policy unrelated to the school populations generated di¤erent habits later in life. This is a typical, and typically hard, empirical-economic problem. Another common technique is to try to look at natural experiments of some policy change that we know or suspect has an immediate a¤ect on behavior between two di¤erent close groups, and see the long-run e¤ect.
If some place banned soda machines from schools, for instance, then investigating whether years later there is a noticeable jump in habits of people at a certain age to those one year younger could indicate a habit-forming change in behavior at a formative age.
Another approach is to attempt to use the e¤ect of past price changes on current behavior, along the lines of the tobacco literature. Earlier economic identi…cation of habits often assumed rational expectations. That means essentially looking for future price e¤ects:
something is habit forming (for a completely rational and informed consumer) in proportion to how much the person will react to perceived future prices in changing current behavior.
But the approach of looking at long-run e¤ects of past prices does not assume rational expectations. 10 This is, empirically, a very hard thing to do. It is very di¢ cult to separate out the e¤ects of a lifetime of di¤erent prices, and it is very hard to …nd people who faced di¤erent prices for entirely "exogenous"reasons.
The existing literature on the addictive nature of smoking attempts to make progress in that domain. While acknowledging the challenges to con…dent identi…cation, Gruber (2001a) probably gives the best guess. Using price variation across states and information on where people grew up, he estimates that something like 25-50% of exogenous increasing in youth smoking translates into adult smoking. That is, of every 100 young people priced out of smoking due to the range of tax changes he observes in the data, 25 (conservative estimate) or more likely 50 of them will never become smokers. Although I …nd Gruber's (2001a) estimates more convincing, see Glied (2003 Glied ( , 2004 , who argues that most of the e¤ects of price-based tobacco reduction among youth disappears by age 40. Although it relies on 10 See Pollak (1970).
many more assumptions about the utility function and empirical estimation, Levy's (2009) estimates can be used to surmise that if we could stop people smoking at all before the age of 30, then two thirds of them would never begin. Levy (2009) also provides evidence of the mistakes involved in smoking among youth: inferring from the price responsiveness and other identi…cation techniques, he suggests that beginning smokers su¤er from projection bias, and are not predicting their future addiction much at all.
Cigarettes are, of course, both more habit forming and far easier to study concretely than "eating habits". It will be much harder to really learn about the long-run nature of eating or exercise habits. But to get a grip on shorter-run e¤ects, some exciting new research by experimental economists has shed some light. Charness and Gneezy (2009) conducted a simple experiment at a gym that indicates that exercise is habit-forming. During a treatment period, they randomly paid some non-gym-goers money to go to the gym, while others in their experiment were treated similarly but not incentivized to go to the gym.
Unsuprisingly (prices again!), those paid to go the gym were more likely to go during the incentives period. Yet, surprisingly or not, this group was also more likely to go even after the incentives were removed. Although this e¤ect wore o¤ over time, there seemed to be a clear habituation to exercise. Acland and Levy (2010) replicated these results in a very similar design, also showing habituation that diminished over time. But they also had subjects in their study make incentivized predictions about their own future behavior at various times and incentive conditions, and were able to show that people were both naive about their self-control problem, and (importantly) that they underappreciated the good habit formation associated with exercise. That is, before they were given incentives to go to they gym, they did not realize that this would make them more eager to go to the gym later. Although the time scales in these studies are necessarily not as long as we'd like, they provide evidence for habit formation and a guide to further research.
